443 571 [203] The market is the place where people meet, inspect merchandise and observe other people, gossip, hear and pass on news items, drink pombe, discuss business and non-business matters, and where they do many things which are useful and many others which are superfluous. Many Barundi visit the market even if they do not intend to buy or sell anything, merely to amuse themselves. If things become too lively in [625] the beer section or if a fight starts, the market police aided by the peaceful elements among the population quickly succeed in restoring order.

436 The German East African heller is the current coin at the main markets of Usumbura, Kajagga, and Gitega. Silver rupees, half rupees, and quarter rupees are seldom seen. Apart from the heller, all sorts of other money substitutes are in circulation at other markets of the northern lakeshore belonging to Urundi. The heller has not yet penetrated into the large area of central Urundi, and it is known only at the few missionary and government posts and along the main roads linking them. Even there it is accepted reluctantly. Beads are still the most important medium of exchange in this area, notwithstanding the efforts of the government to introduce hellers and rupees everywhere in order to facilitate not only trade but also the future collection of taxes. These efforts will only meet with success after Urundi has actually been placed under government administration and after a hut or head tax has been introduced which has to be paid in currency. The same is true of Ruanda. There, however, the use of currency has already spread considerably as a result of the export trade and the residency at Kigali with its traders' settlement which has been established in the interior for years.

The small coin most in use in Urundi is the pink bead simsim or samsam; a string (kete, Kette? [Kette, "string" in German]) of beads, approximately 30 centimeters long, is the monetary unit. It is equivalent to three hellers. Ten strings equal 1 ifundo; 10 ifundo equal 1 ingoje; 10 ingoje equal 1 [301] akanono (No. 19, p. 111). The samsam bead is also used as the principal neck ornament of men and women.

178 changes completely. Speculation is gaining ground.
177 Certain cultures are spreading rapidly (cassava, which
[241] grows all the year round and so excludes the threat of famine ; coffee which yields a profit in cash, and helps to pay the tax-collector).

178 Finally, some house-groups have appeared of a type,
177 closer perhaps to town than to village, in the neigh-
361 bourhood of *bomas* (colonial administration centres)
563 or markets. Their inhabitants it is true are mostly foreigners : Belgian officials, European traders (Greeks), Hindus and Arabs, *baswahili* (Islamized negroes). It remains however that they are an entirely new feature in a country with such a widely dispersed population.

Conclusions

361 I thought I could draw your attention to some details of the curious Urundi organization : a dense
571 population, widely dispersed over the cultivable and habitable land according to the geographic possibilities, without any orientation centres (the few habitations of the chiefs cannot be said to produce anything like demographic concentration) ; the small part played by neighbourhood relations, the predominance of intricate, but personal ties, creating man-to-man dependance, or in other words the primacy of the vertical over the horizontal relationships.

Such an organization was possible in a country almost completely closed to foreign influence, without either markets or money, with a hierarchical structure and must be related to conditions both ethnographical and geographical. This organization is
[177 giving way under the influence of European ad-
178] ministration, of the development of trade, and of a new economy based more and more upon monetary transactions.

[p. 16 (8)]

4: Maquet E-5 (1950-1951) 1954 FO42 Rundi FO42

from the heavenly world. According to some versions of this tale, they came with their servant, Mutwa, who mated with a forest ape. From that union all Batwa are descended. Such tales clearly reveal the fundamental differences which the Banyarwanda see among their castes.

When such a picture of 'natural' differences, so significant from the point of view of power, is accepted, the inevitable consequence is that some men are born chiefs and others labourers. Inferiority and superiority are due not to personal qualities but to membership of certain groups. By belonging to different castes, people have fundamentally unequal rights. If an ordinary Mututsi kills a Muhutu, one kinsman of the murderer could eventually be killed in retaliation if the king authorized it. If the murderer was a Muhutu and the victim a Mututsi, two lives were taken.

The principle of the fundamental inequality between social groups thus established in Ruanda has spread from the original inter-caste relations to intra-caste situations. A man superior to another member of his class because of his functions or his wealth, or even his ability, tends to assume towards his inferior an attitude similar to that of a Mututsi *vis-à-vis* a Muhutu. Of course the conception of inequality between superiors and inferiors of the same class is not so rigid as that between the castes, but it permeates all hierarchical situations in Ruanda.

The theme of inequality was embodied in the indigenous political organization, so that political relations clearly express the attitudes socially expected from superiors and inferiors. They are quite understandable if one bears in mind that they originate from an inter-caste situation. Authority as such is all-embracing. According to Western conceptions, any authority is defined not only as regards the people who are subject to it, but also in respect of the matters falling within its competence. A man who gives orders to another because they are on different levels in a hierarchical scale may be considered his equal in other relations. In Ruanda, there is almost no sphere of life in which an inferior is free from the interference of his superior. Because Batutsi are considered fundamentally superior to the Bahutu, there is no field in which they can feel equal. This attitude has been transferred to any hierarchical situation. The complementary attitude of dependence is, of course, expected from the inferior. Inferiority is the relative situation of a person who has to submit to another in a clearly defined field; dependence is inferiority in the totality of life. The dependent person has to submit to his master in any question. There is no domain where he is free even to express a contrary opinion. As the dependent has always to acquiesce even when orders are quite impracticable, he has to conceal his opinions and find excuses for not doing what has been ordered. Double-dealing, politeness, or a utilitarian conception of language, are the only defences of the dependent. Some time ago, a Ruanda deliberative assembly of people of standing was asked its opinion on a contemplated reform. When the most important person had given his views, everybody voted for his proposition. But after the assembly, many expressed disagreement. At the

4: Maquet E-5 (1950-1951) 1954 FO42 Rundi FO42

time of the vote, they had considered it improper and impolite not to agree with their superior.

On the other hand, no superior enjoys a purely arbitrary power. There are norms which are informally enforced by social pressure; and this is particularly important for people so concerned about their reputations. Since, moreover, there are several chiefs of equal rank belonging to different political structures, it is not difficult for the subject of one superior to secure support in opposing him from another. Finally, there is the possibility of appeal to a higher authority empowered to control subordinate chiefs. All this limits, in fact, the authority of chiefs, but nevertheless the authority of a superior cannot be questioned by his subjects. They may escape, intrigue, or look for another protector, but they cannot offer direct opposition. The Western conception of contract, derived from Roman law, with well-defined obligations on both parties who are equal before and during the contract, is accordingly not understood or acted upon even by Banyarwanda who have long been familiar with our culture.

Any superior is a protector, and his protection is of the same character as his authority: all-embracing and limited only by his own convenience. In any difficulty, the inferior may ask the help of his master, and, if help is refused, it will not be on the grounds that the superior is not concerned with that aspect of the life of the subordinate. On the other hand, the superior himself will be the only judge of the limits of his intervention, for the dependent has no right to require anything from his superior.

Everywhere men in authority enjoy advantages denied to those whom they command, but it is often felt that justification is needed for these privileges. In Ruanda such rationalizations do not seem to be required. It is taken for granted by everybody, the subjects included, that superiors as such should derive profits from their position. The very high standard of living of Europeans is accepted without any criticism by 'traditional' Banyarwanda not yet imbued with egalitarian principles.

The conception of authority as all-embracing, unlimited, protective, profitable, and of inferiority as dependent, devoid of rights, fundamentally weak, and generally exploited, is exactly suited to a structure of castes composed of human beings who are thought to be fundamentally different and unequal. On these inter-caste relations all hierarchical relations have been modelled. This means that the conceptions and attitudes which have just been sketched pervade most human relations in Ruanda. Indeed, very many human interactions involve persons who, in Ruanda, are placed on a hierarchical scale: man and woman, husband and wife, mother and child, father and son, old and young, craftsman and apprentice, &c., and when there is also a superiority-inferiority situation, even though confined to one aspect of the relation, the whole of that relation is impregnated with inequality.

Another basic principle governing the field of human relations in Ruanda is that of indefinite reciprocity. Whenever somebody receives a service,

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[Information on the Biru, a body of ranked dignitaries in the Ruanda central government, will be found in category 645.]

9: Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

The conditions favouring contamination by different diseases and the very limited defences against them permit us to assume that illness and mortality through these diseases must have been very high and a constant threat to everybody.

These brief notes on health conditions in Ruanda would be incomplete without a mention of mental health. We are not attempting here an assessment of the neuroses and psychoses which can be found in Ruanda or to the number of people affected by them and who, in the Western world, would be considered in need of psychiatric treatment. There is not sufficient information on these matters at present. But we would like to consider very briefly conditions which are likely to result in psychological tensions.

We have already mentioned the circumstances which make life objectively hard (a barely sufficient diet, starvation periods, and diseases). In addition it was often dangerous. When informants were asked what sort of reputation they particularly wished to avoid, they did not usually answer by listing the opposites of those particular qualities which they would like to have attributed to them, but by pointing to some definite reputation in which danger might be inherent. Above all, a Tutsi feared to be regarded as an enemy of the king. It was no doubt partly because he felt a genuine respect for the king, but mainly because to be thought of as an enemy of the king was extremely dangerous. It could mean dispossession of everything, the severance of all social relations, exile, or even death. He also feared to be considered a traitor to his chief. This was a less dangerous reputation, although it entailed sanctions: if a client had been disloyal to his lord the latter might take back from him all the cattle he had previously given him and eventually all his cattle. The Hutu said that they feared an accusation of witchcraft, for such an accusation could certainly mean immediate death. There was little that could be done actively to avoid such a danger except to be a good neighbour, to be envied by nobody, to have no enemies, and especially to have a powerful protector. The Hutu were also afraid of acquiring any reputation which could result in their losing the protection of the lord to whom they owed allegiance and consequently leaving them exposed and defenceless against the arbitrary actions of the powerful.[21]

[21] Cf. Maquet, 1954a, or Maquet, 1958.

9: Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

inzu. Their inclusion depended on the situation of Ego's generation with regard to the ancestor recognized as the originator of the group. Suppose a new inzu had begun with F (Diagram B), in the sense that F's descendants referred to themselves as 'people of F' rather than as 'people of A' (as F referred to himself). In that case, Ego would not consider E (FaFaFaFa) as of his inzu although he knew that he was the father of his great-grandfather.

Or suppose that D was considered as the origin of the inzu. In that case Ego's son, J, was separated from D by five links. It was quite possible that if, for instance, G had had many children and had been a man of standing and repute, J and K (and all G's descendants in their generations) would some day refer to themselves as 'people of G'. As long as Ego was living, however, J would consider himself as a member of the same inzu as his father and Ego would not think of his son as belonging to another inzu. One informant, Kayijuka, told us that one of his great-grandchildren will probably take the initiative in forming the new inzu of 'people of Kayijuka'.[5]

Although the inzu was a transitory group about six generations deep, it must be understood that the formation of a new inzu was not rigidly determined and did not automatically happen at the birth of the first child in the seventh generation. The operative factors were mainly the fast growing number of inzu members after a few generations (in genealogies collected, the sixth



Diagram B.

[5] This was no boast as Kayijuka is now a very important political personality in Ruanda. It may be of interest to mention that Kayijuka was at the court, as a young nobleman, when the first Europeans entered the country. At that time there was a considerable amount of suspicion on both sides. A missionary asked him to point out the queen-mother among the women who were present at the Court. This was prohibited as it was feared that the White Fathers could harm her by magic. Kayijuka did it, however, and for that reason, when the visitors had gone, he was blinded with a red hot iron. But as on the following day he addressed somebody by name after having recognized the voice, it was believed that the operation had not been a success and it was performed a second time. Kayijuka is now a loyal courtier of the king.

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

generation alone seems to comprise about 100 persons), the existence of a man prominent (by wealth, political functions, &c.) among the ascendants closer than the fifth, or a change of residence. The first two factors were usually realized in the span of six generations. If they were not, and if the inzu remained a small group of, say, a dozen people, these and their descendants went on referring to themselves as 'people of' an ancestor of the seventh, eighth, or ninth generation. One informant told us that his own inzu, already six generations deep, was not yet numerous enough to be split into new ones though it probably would be after two more generations. The fact that the ancestor of a new inzu was chosen, and was not simply the son of the ancestor of the former inzu, shows that there was a definite emphasis on the personal prominence of the ancestor.

Among the Tutsi, it seems that inzu tended to grow rather large before segmenting. In their intrigues for power, it was an advantage to be connected by agnatic links to many and important people. Consequently, before initiating the formation of a new inzu, the Tutsi were very cautious: they did not want to diminish their social power by severing their connexions with the members of their present inzu. Besides, a change of residence was a less compelling reason for the Tutsi to split the inzu: they were not attached to a particular region to the same extent as the Hutu; when appointed to different offices, they often had to move from one part of the country to another and they frequently travelled to the court.

The formation of a new inzu was not necessarily a segmentation resulting in the concomitant formation of two new units of the same age and importance. It could happen that among the inzu 'people of A', those of the sixth generation who were the descendants of B preferred to think of themselves as 'people of B' because B was a famous warrior and they were numerous enough to constitute an inzu of their own. This did not compel those of the sixth generation who were descendants of C and D to do the same. They would go on considering themselves 'people of A'. After a couple more generations, when the number of the descendants of F had increased, they would refer to themselves as 'people of F' who was a rich owner of cows, and the descendants of G as 'people of G' because he had been an important province chief, whereas the descendants of C would some day take the name of 'people of E' if they moved into another region.

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

613 Umulyango appears to have been the group of living people
511 who would have belonged to the same inzu if that primitive inzu had not split into new ones. This explains the fluidity of the use of the term. For instance the word 'Abareganshuro' (people of Mureganshuro) has meant first 'the members of the inzu of Mureganshuro'; then, after the splitting of that inzu, 'the members of the umulyango of Mureganshuro'. When an inzu divided into different new ones, the ancestor of the former one became the ancestor of the umulyango. Thus the umulyango link existed between members of different inzu having the same origin.

As may be expected, the strength of these links was quite different at the time of the splitting and a few generations afterwards. This accounts for the fact that in some cases the umulyango appears almost as a corporate group very similar to an inzu, and in other cases as a purely nominal group.

The span of life of an umulyango seems less defined than that of an inzu. It is doubtful, however, whether it was longer. Suppose inzu A splits into B and C and becomes umulyango A. Six generations later inzu B splits into inzu D and E and becomes umulyango B. At that time it is very likely that the primitive ancestor being twelve generations past will not be clearly remembered and that, except for some extraordinary reason, he will be superseded by the ancestor of umulyango B.

614 Descent groups in Ruanda were thus of two different types
613 A permanent group, the ubwoko which fulfilled the definition of patriclan (if exogamy be excluded from that definition) and two temporary groups, inzu and umulyango, the second being rather
613 the surviving shadow of the first. The latter were both patrilin-
128 eages. As they were not segments in the same sense as among, e.g. the Nuer, it would be misleading to differentiate them according to the terminology of Evans-Pritchard.[7] We would suggest calling inzu a primary and umulyango a secondary patrilineage in order to convey the idea that the umulyango originated from the inzu and that the inzu's functions were more important for the individual and society at large than those of the umulyango.[8]

[7] Evans-Pritchard, 1940, pp. 192-4.

[8] Members of the inzu were called *bavandimwe* (which primarily means sibling), agnatic relatives, *benewacu* and relatives, affines included, *abacu*.

[601]

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

for instance with a widow, intercourse took place with a brother or a parallel cousin of the deceased husband.

Among the Hutu when the inzu as such possessed fields (*ingobii* or *ubukonde*), as happened particularly in the northern area (Bugoyi, Mulera, Ndorwa), the individual member had a right to a plot (*isambo*). He could not sell such a plot, but could let it (at a rent of about one hoe for two years). If the ancestor has received cows from a lord (*shebuja*), these cows, or rather their offspring, were the property of the inzu which happened to have some pasture land. Among the Tutsi there were usually no land rights vested in the inzu. Tutsi as well as Hutu inzu had no sacred place other than the ancestor's shrine in the *rugo* (enclosure) of the lineage-head and the small huts in the enclosure of each descendant.

From this one may infer that the lineage group at the end of the nineteenth century was not a group with a territorial basis. It is very likely that a territorial lineage group was common among the Hutu and had persisted in the north where Hutu were predominant and where Tutsi occupation had always been scanty and superficial (there were very few Tutsi settlers in that region, apart from administrative chiefs).* On the other hand all the activities of the inzu just described implied a rather close co-residence (which is, of course, different from the concept of a territorial basis). These frequent gatherings, blood-feuds, and the rendering of help in difficult circumstances would hardly have been possible if the members of the group had been living in scattered places several days' journey apart. This explains also the crucial importance of the change of residence in the formation of a new inzu. When a branch of an inzu had to leave and settle elsewhere, it was bound to become a new inzu because the former relations with the members of the inzu who did not move could not have been maintained, at least among the Hutu and ordinary Tutsi. This was less important for Tutsi chiefs who were in any case moving about and travelling frequently.

(c) Social roles within the inzu

Following the authors of *Toward a General Theory of Action*, social role is understood here as the totality of reciprocal

* For an account of the specific structure of the kinship system in the north of Rwanda, the present-day districts (*territoires*) of Kisenyi, Ruhengeri and part of Biumba, see Hertefelt, 1959.

9: Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

to the oldest brother's as regards her younger sisters. But the importance of seniority was less stressed among sisters than among brothers. There was often rivalry between married sisters as there was no taboo on intercourse between a woman and her sister's husband.

Sisters and brothers were playmates during their childhood. After puberty their relations were restricted, but certainly not to the point of avoidance. As girls did not inherit from the father, as they were the prospective paternal aunts of the future children of their brothers, the relations between siblings of opposite sexes did not manifest the same covert strain as that between brothers.

Parallel paternal male cousins of Ego were assimilated to his brothers, but as there was no inheritance rivalry, and as Ego was not required to manifest a particular respect for his eldest cousin, Ego's actual relation with his parallel cousins was in fact more fraternal than with his brothers. Ego considered the daughters of his paternal uncle as sisters with whom there was a marriage prohibition. There was consequently a certain reserve between them which, however, did not prevent them from exchanging obscene jokes at a celebration or a gathering, but any sexual acts were severely tabooed.

(d) Organization and activities of the umulyango and the ubwoko

The two other descent groups may be described much more briefly. The secondary patrilineage when it had just divided from the primary group continued to share in the previous functions of the formerly united inzu. There were still gatherings of the descendants of the umulyango's ancestor, mutual aid, judgements in disputes, and participation in the blood-feuds. But gradually these activities were confined more and more within the new inzu and after an intermediate period, the umulyango generally disappeared as a corporate group.[13] Obviously if the splitting was due to a change of residence or a dispute, the functions of the former inzu were very quickly assumed by the new one and relations with other branches of the former inzu (which then constituted an umulyango) were not very close.

Did the umulyango as such have any special characteristics or activities? All our informants agree on the rule of exogamy.

[13] For a definition of a corporate group see Radcliffe-Brown and Forde, 1950, p. 41.

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

592 Economic co-operation was not limited to husband and wife. Their children, their relatives living with them, their clients, and servants participated in productive activities. Each compound was supposed to produce the necessary foodstuffs for its inhabitants. In polygynous families the husband sometimes made his wives work together in common fields, but this was not the socially approved pattern.

(c) *Procreational function*

181 554 When a Tutsi informant was asked what the people of his group wished for above all, the answer came immediately: 'Children and cows'. A further question, 'Why?', disclosed that they were not regarded as ultimate values to be sought for themselves but that they were intermediate ones, the means to attain more important fundamental ends—power (*amaboko*) and reputation (*ugukomera*).

571 To be powerful is to be able to exert significant pressure upon somebody. In Ruanda society that meant, for a Tutsi, to be able to compel somebody to give him tribute in labour or in kind, and to induce assistance in support of his claims. To have many children was almost indispensible for this purpose. Girls, by their marriages, extended family connexions. Boys were sent while very young to the court of the king or of an important chief, and thereby reinforced their father's influence very considerably. He would be able to know from his son what was going on and the king or chief would be constantly reminded of the father by the son's presence, which was considered a great advantage for the father. The boy could also increase the influence of his family by becoming the client of a powerful Tutsi. By this means he obtained protection and cattle for himself and his patrilineage. Finally the matrimonial alliances of his sons could create new links between the father's kin group and his daughters-in-law's lineages. To sum up, from the point of view of power, the significance of children was to provide cattle and connexions. Cattle, as will be explained later on in more detail, had very much the same function as money in our culture: to provide the man who owns it with means to exert pressure on those who do not have enough money of their own and thus need to get some in exchange for services. By connexions is meant here that type of relationship in which one party may require something from another under the covert threat of a sanction.

557 858 [556] [571]

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

(*d*) *Intergroup political relations*

Intergroup political relations are essentially different. They do not imply inferiority and superiority. The opposite assumption is made: the two groups are supposed to be independent and equal. If by diplomacy or by war one succeeds in subduing the other, the subsequent unequal relations will be more similar to intragroup than to intergroup political relations.

If our definition of intragroup political organization be accepted, the word 'political' when applied to intergroup relations conveys a different and derivative meaning. Those who control legitimate coercion within a social structure are also those who are qualified to enter into intergroup relations. Subjects do not represent their own group, only rulers do. The ability to deal with intergroup relations results from a superior situation in internal political relations. In that sense, the political external relations may be said to be secondary. In the following account of Ruanda political organization the emphasis will be on the primary political relations, the internal ones.

• • •

In Ruanda, there were two types of relationships sanctioned by legitimate coercion on the part of the superior. Consequently we may distinguish within the political organization two structures which may be termed administrative and military. Another system of social relations was the clientage structure or the feudal organization. It occupied an intermediate position between the political and the private spheres. It was not purely political, but it was much more than a private agreement such as a loan. Consequently the feudal relations in Ruanda will be considered in close connexion with the administrative and military ones.

The three structures were interwoven and interconnected at each level. This was particularly the case at the top and at the bottom. The mwami held the supreme position in the three systems and the commoners were taxpayers, members of an army, and clients. In the intermediate levels it happened, too, that a superior and an inferior were linked by several ties: one could be at the same time the lord and the cattle-chief of an individual, and the client of one's army chief.

I shall describe and analyse each structure separately.

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

that no other authority had the final say in such appointments.

The danger of having some chiefs becoming more and more independent of the central government was avoided by the mwami's power to dismiss anybody and also by the curious duality of chiefs in each district. Increasing the control of the central government over its subordinates seems to have been the function of that duality. Tensions arose between these two chiefs who were neighbours and who exerted their prerogatives in the same territory yet were independent of each other. The mwami was always kept well informed by each of these chiefs of the exactions or suspicious activities of the other. Moreover, both chiefs had the same subordinate, the hill-chief. Consequently the mwami could be sure that if by chance the two chiefs were in agreement, it was very likely that if their common subordinate had some difficulty with one of his superiors, he would attempt and often succeed in getting the other on to his side: *duobus litigantibus tertius gaudens.* In addition, as conflicts of power were unavoidable in such a situation, the chief had to resort to the mwami as judge. In that way the links of the dependence of both of them on the mwami were tightened.

In this analysis it is not suggested that the duality of chiefs was conceived and put into being by a certain mwami in order to fulfil what we regard here as its function. It is possible that it happened in that way. But even if nobody ever thought of reinforcing the royal power by this dual organization, it was nevertheless its function in Ruanda society.

(c) *Social cohesion*

I have mentioned that the hill-chief required dues and tributes not from the individual taxpayer but from the lineage head when possible, and the latter demanded it from the family head. This way of reaching the individual through his kin group and family group enhanced the importance of the descent principle of of kin solidarity. Even in Ruanda where the political organization had taken over so many functions from descent groups, the individual as such was not yet recognized in very important matters like the contributions to the maintenance of the rulers. In this interpretation, the kinship and the administrative structures promote the social cohesion of the group as a whole.

To provide the central government with regular revenues, to

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

courage of their forbears were made known to them, and the picture of the ideal Tutsi was impressed upon them.

The three main components of that ideal picture were *ubutware*, *ubugabo*, and *itonde*. *Ubutware* was the military courage so important in a group of conquerors. *Ubugabo* meant the quality of being a man (*mugabo*). This included trustworthiness in reference to promises, generosity in treating one's friends well, liberality towards the poor, moral courage to accept one's responsibilities. In a society where relations of inferiority and superiority were predominantly personal in the sense that authority was rarely abstract (a law, a principle) but generally identified with a person (chief, king, lord, &c.), emphasis was put on fidelity in all interpersonal relationships. *Itonde* could be translated by self-mastery. To lose one's temper, to manifest violent emotions was shameful. Anger, particularly, could not be violently expressed. The demeanour of a Tutsi was always to be dignified, polite, amiable, and a little supercilious. It was taken for granted that only vulgar persons showed off all their emotions. Hutu not being very self-controlled were much impressed by the external dignity of the Tutsi. There was in the *intore* companies a practical training in self-control. By jeers and scoffing, companions of the young Tutsi as well as older people, tried to make him angry and if he reacted emotionally, he was punished by further jokes. So finally he was able to remain apparently quiet and polite in any circumstances which would have elicited more violent reactions from people not thus trained.

Instruction aims at communicating a specialized knowledge and at teaching abilities in order to prepare certain individuals to fulfil the specialized tasks particularly useful to their group. The Ruanda armies instructed the young Tutsi in becoming experts in war and raiding. Some Tutsi are still proud of the superiority of their strategy over that of the Hima, pastoralists of related origin, who were living a more nomadic life in neighbouring territories.[21]

This socialization process, equipping personalities with qualities required of a nobleman, a courtier, and a warrior, was intended for Tutsi only. Hutu young men were not *intore* and did not become warriors, although Hutu were also members of the armies. But for them it meant being auxiliaries who carried the supplies

[21] On Hima, see Wilde, 1957.

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

necessary to the warriors during the expeditions, and being liable for various services.

(c) *Army and lineage*

In its herdsmen's section, an army was constituted of patrilineages rather than individuals. According to 100 per cent. of the informants, the inzu head was the necessary intermediary between the army-chief and the army members of his lineage. He had the important task of apportioning the dues incumbent on the lineage between the different family heads. For instance when the numbering took place, he decided who was going to give, say, the three cows which were due by the lineage as such.

This connexion between the army, a group founded on a wide territorial basis, and the lineage, a group based on kinship, was very significant from two points of view.

Firstly, social cohesion was favoured and strengthened by the integration into one single structure of two systems which embodied different principles of grouping. In some other societies such systems remained independent. In Ruanda they formed a supple and strong network by which each Ruanda was tied to a political structure through a kinship structure.

Secondly, the authority of the inzu head over his kinsmen was limited by his incorporation in the military structure. In some circumstances an inzu member could ignore the authority of his inzu head and with the protection of his army-chief, remain independently in the army. At the numbering of cattle, for instance, he could present his own cattle separately from those of his patrilineage. This was, of course, advantageous for the chief who could claim a proportion of the cattle of the lineage plus a fraction of the cattle of the independent member. The lineage members could also bring a charge against their inzu chief before the army-chief, who could sometimes dismiss him. This limited the power of the lineage head and incited him to remain on good terms at the same time with his army-chief and the members of his inzu. This principle limiting the power of intermediary chiefs by the direct recourse of their subordinates to a superior authority had other applications in the Ruanda political organization. Its function was to reinforce the authority of the superior chief and to protect subordinates by giving them the possibility of resisting

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

their immediate superiors without endangering the principle of authority and social discipline.

From the point of view of social cohesion between the different strata of the population, it should be mentioned also that Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa were affiliated to the same army. But as the last two groups had only a secondary and not a fighting role in war, one cannot think that their association with the army was extremely important in this respect.

(d) Redistribution of wealth

Within Ruanda society, the main function of the army was that it acted as an agency for the redistribution of wealth, i.e. consumption goods and cattle.

Fresh milk provided by the *inkuke*, milk brought in jars, agricultural produce, spoils of the chase, pottery, butcher's meat, and steers utilized for divination purposes were consumption goods. Included in this category was statute labour (building and repairing royal enclosures). Most of these goods could not be kept for a long time and had thus to be provided regularly. This kind of tribute is characteristic of cultures which have neither a sufficient knowledge of the means of storing perishable goods nor a standard value of exchange permitting the dues to be collected in 'money'.

The beneficiary was the king. In this respect the army fulfilled a function very similar to that of the administrative structure.

A second category of wealth redistributed through the channel of the army was cattle. They constituted a special category of goods because of the particular significance of their possession in Ruanda society. Cattle, whatever their economic value, had a unique prestige value. One was as proud to be the owner of a beautiful herd of long-horned cows as, in some other societies, to possess race-horses. During the European Middle Ages, a noble had to have some landed property. Without going down in public estimation and losing his status, he could not have exchanged his real estate for gold and other goods of that kind even if they were 'worth' much more. Cattle in Ruanda were also noblemen's property. A Tutsi who did not own any cattle was still a Tutsi but a very poor one, dangerously slipping down in the social stratification, whereas a Hutu who possessed cattle was very near the aristocratic group and not infrequently could marry a Tutsi girl.

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

be favoured. This was a kind of redistribution of wealth among the lineages of the army made according to the preferences of the army-chief. Thirdly, the warriors as such did not receive cows from the army-chief (but they could be at the same time warriors and herdsmen). Their only privilege as warriors was to loot privately after the *abakoni* had laid hold on the 'bow of the army'. Moreover, if they had shown any particular gallantry, the mwami or the army-chief rewarded them with a gift of a few cows.

(*e*) *Protection*

When compared with the considerable benefits in cattle that the king and the army-chief derived from the military structure, the advantages of ordinary army members, particularly the warriors, seem to have been very meagre. The army tribute in goods and services were compensated for in a different way by the protection extended to his subordinates by the army-chief.

This protection could be asked for and received in all the difficult circumstances of life without being limited to any particular kind of circumstances. An instance frequently mentioned by our informants was the army-chief's support to one of his subordinates who was a party in a lawsuit. If the protection of a man of high standing appeared useful or necessary in such a situation one must suppose that judicial decisions were not taken only on the case's own merits, but that the respective power of the two protectors was weighed by the judge.

The army-chief's protection was diffuse and general, not limited to a few cases clearly defined. We have already come across such a characteristic of the superior's protection in respect of the chiefs of the administrative hierarchy. This suggests that power relations were emphasized in Ruanda and that the rights and properties of isolated men, that is to say those not identified in any respect with a powerful one, were insecure.

The judicial role of the army-chief must be related to his function of protection. In the disputes between two members of his army, he exercised a kind of paternal jurisdiction, as did any Ruanda authority. In contentions between members of different armies, the fact that the question was settled by the army-chiefs concerned suggests more a compromise in which each chief acted as a representative of one of the litigants, than a judgement based on pre-established norms.

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

The army-chief's protection was not unconditionally granted to any army member. The chief could refuse to give support to one of his subordinates if he had been disobedient or disloyal. It was up to the chief himself to decide if his warrior or herdsman had an objectionable attitude. The fact that the chief was the only judge of the attitude did not, of course, give the subordinate the assurance of a fair treatment; however, the chief could not indulge often in arbitrary refusals of help because a member could always leave the army and join another if allowed to do so by the chief of this other army. Moreover, the principle of recourse to a superior authority against an intermediate authority was operative here also. If discontent was widespread in an army, the chief could be dismissed by the mwami. Consequently the chief had to take into account public opinion to some extent and could not be indifferent to his popularity. It is clear, however, that the means of pressure that a chief did have on his subordinates were more efficient than the ones subordinates had on him. They had thus to assume a submissive attitude and to gain the chief's favour by gifts and proper behaviour.

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The different functions of the military structure of Ruanda were profitable mainly to the rulers: they contributed to the maintenance in power positions of those who were occupying them. Through that structure, the king secured, in addition to what he received from his tax collectors, an important amount of commodities (necessary for the upkeep of a numerous court), more cattle (consequently the possibility to increase the number of people personally bound to him), and a more complete control of all the chiefs under him (by the possibility of a direct recourse of the subordinates to the royal supreme authority). The ruling position of the army-chiefs was also consolidated by their increase of control on cattle.

The preceding analysis has also disclosed how the army was an important instrument of domination for the Tutsi caste. Warriors being recruited only among Tutsi, organized physical force was exclusively theirs. They alone had in their hands the ultimate basis of political power. Moreover, by the serious training of the *intore*, the aristocratic values and virtues so well adapted for domination were inculcated into the new generations.

The army organization was also a factor for maintenance of the

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

[P 129]

CHAPTER VI

THE CLIENTAGE STRUCTURE

1. DESCRIPTION OF THE *BUHAKE* INSTITUTION

THE *buhake* is an institution to which anthropologists who have studied Ruanda social structure have devoted a great part of their attention, if not the greatest. The name is not easily translated. *Buhake* comes from *guhakwa*, a verb meaning 'to pay one's respects to a superior in his court'.[1] It has been called cattle-lease (*bail à cheptel*),[2] recommendation (in the sense of the mediaeval latin *recommendatio*),[3] and contract of pastoral servitude.[4]

The *buhake* denoted the relation which existed between a person called *garagu* and another called *shebuja*. That relationship was created when an individual, Hutu or Tutsi, who had an inferior social prestige and who was less well provided with cattle, offered his services to and asked protection from a person whose status was higher and whose wealth was greater. The following sentences were usually, but not ritually said by the man offering his services, after he had given a jug of beer or hydromel to the other: *urampe amata* (I ask you milk), *urankize* (make me rich), *uramenye* (always think of me), *urambere umubyeyi* (be my father), *n'ange nzakubera umwana* (I shall be your child).

If the offer was accepted, the man in the superior position bestowed on the other one or several cows. From that time on, they were in the institutionalized relation of *shebuja* (which I translate 'lord' or 'patron') and *garagu* ('client').

(a) *The client's rights*

The rights the client enjoyed over the cattle granted to him were those of usufruct: he had full rights of ownership over milk, the male increase of the cattle, and the meat and skin of a cow which had died or had had to be slaughtered. The female increase of the cattle remained at his disposal under the same conditions as the original cows given to him by the *shebuja*. Cows received

[1] Sandrart, 1930, p. 151.
[2] De Lacger, 1939, vol. I, p. 45.
[3] Vanhove, 1941, p. 48; Bourgeois, 1938.
[4] Kagame, 1952, p. 18.

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

from a patron could be granted by the client to somebody else by another *buhake* agreement in which the original client became a lord. The protection granted by the patron included support in lawsuits (*kulengera*): according to thirty-nine per cent. of our informants, it was usual and very useful to be accompanied by one's *shebuja* if one wanted to be judged by the mwami. Moreover the patron extended help to his client if the latter was in a state of poverty. For instance, he gave milk for the *garagu*'s children if their father's cows did not yield enough; he contributed to the payment of the bride-wealth if the client and his lineage could not meet the expenses; he provided his Hutu *garagu* with a hoe when it was needed; he granted meat and hides to his client if, on certain occasions, they were badly needed. When the *garagu* committed an offence, his lord had to help him out of his predicament by paying the fine or the compensation to the victim (*kugura*).[5] If the client was murdered and his lineage was too weak to do anything about it, the *shebuja* had to demand justice from the mwami or even avenge his death by blood feud (*kumuhorera*). Finally, if, after the *garagu*'s death, his widow and children could not be taken care of by his brothers or parallel cousins, the lord had to help them (*kumuremera*).

(*b*) *The client's obligations*

On the other hand, the client had to go and pay his respects to his lord. This included personal service which required the presence of the client at the patron's rugo for a certain time. Some obligations were common to Hutu and Tutsi *garagu*. They were: to accompany the *shebuja* when he was travelling, for instance when he went to the king's court or participated in a military expedition (*kumutabaraho*); to carry the lord's messages (*gutumwa*); to build or repair a part of the *shebuja*'s rugo (*kubak' inkiko*). It was advisable also for clients, Hutu as well as Tutsi, to offer from time to time to their patron, some presents such as jugs of beer. If the lord happened to lose his herds, the *garagu* had to provide him with cattle and jars of milk. Some services were imposed only on Hutu clients, such as working in the *shebuja's* fields (*kutanga imibyizi*), or joining the night watch in the lord's enclosure (*kurarira*).[6]

[5] Cf. Vanhove, 1941, p. 77a.
[6] Cf. Bandrart, 1930, p. 15a; Vanhove, 1941, p. 75a.

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

The measure of the different obligatory gifts and services (number of days, &c.), was not fixed. It depended on the *shebuja*'s temper, his requirements, the number of cows granted to the *garagu*, and on the client's expectations. Moreover, each client was usually not requested to fulfil all the obligations we have just mentioned. The patron, particularly if he had many *garagu*, frequently gave to each of them a precise task in which the client was particularly competent (to brew beer, to cook, to mind the cattle, &c.). Even now, in spite of the limitations added by the native courts to the clients' obligations (for instance the building and repairing of the enclosure cannot be claimed by the lord more than once a year; not more than a month a year may be required by the patron for all the household services, &c.), we are still far from having a list of precisely defined duties and claims standard for the whole of Ruanda.

(*c*) *End of the* buhake *relation*

The *buhake* relationship was perpetuated even after the death of both parties. The *shebuja*'s heirs inherited their father's relations of *buhake*, *vis-à-vis* his clients and the client's heirs kept the cows (and/or their progeny) granted to their father. But the *shebuja* had the right to refuse to recognize as a successor of his client a person without the proper qualities to be a good *garagu*. The lord could then designate another heir of his client, or end the relationship and take back the cows. The person receiving an important number of clients by inheritance (several dozen, for instance) could require them to present him with all the cows which were then numbered, as in the case of the army-chief's *murundo*; he could then choose a certain number of them, usually the best ones, which he took away from his clients either to keep the usufruct himself or to endow other people with them.

The *buhake* relation could be ended when both client and patron or only one of them wanted this. But the person who initiated the breaking off usually gave some reason for it, such as the non-fulfilment of a particular obligation by the other party. At all events the *shebuja* could not oblige his client to stay in his service and the client could not prevent his patron from dismissing him.

What happened to the cows in such a case? As mentioned earlier, all the cows a client effectively controlled were not necessarily received from a patron, that is to say they were not all *inkazibiti*

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

when the client was Hutu and *ingabane* when he was Tutsi. A *garagu* could have cows from another source (called *imbata*) such as those received as bride-wealth, as a reward for bravery or acquired by exchanging other goods. In the case of a Hutu client, who possessed both *inkazibiti* and *imbata* at the time when his relation with a *shebuja* was broken off, there are two opinions with regard to the cows' ownership. According to the first, the *imbata* possessed by the client before he entered in the *buhake* relation were regarded as *inkazibiti* and consequently the lord had the same rights over them as over those he had given to the client as cows of *buhake*. Moreover, the cows which the client eventually acquired when he was already *garagu*, and which in other circumstances would have been regarded as *imbata*, were also added to the cows received from the lord. The result was that at the breaking off of the *buhake* relation, the patron could take all his client's cows, *imbata* as well as *inkazibiti*. The other opinion is that the *imbata* acquired by the client before or after the *buhake* relation began, remained definitely *imbata* and that the lord had no claim on them.

It seems that both opinions are accurate, but that they refer to different periods. The second probably expresses the most ancient rule which had been prevalent up to about 1920. The practice of merging *imbata* and *inkazibiti* (or *ingabane*) in favour of the lord is likely to have been introduced only during the last forty years. This would be due to the fact that the chiefs of the administrative divisions (recognized by the Belgian authority under the names of *chefferies* and *sous-chefferies*) assumed at the end of the reign of king Yuhi Musinga (who was dismissed from his royal charge by the Belgian Administration in 1931) an undue importance, because their powers were no longer counterbalanced by those of the chiefs of the other hierarchies. Army chiefs did not enjoy their former authority, as the military structure had received no official recognition; Musinga, isolated in an attitude of indifference and hostility towards Europeans, was left without much effective power. Administrative chiefs who were important lords are said to have taken advantage of this situation, and to have modified the custom to their own advantage by establishing the principle of the merging of the cows received from the lord with those acquired independently of any *shebuja*.

It was not impossible, though it was rare, to be the client of

9: Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

It was not impossible, though it was rare, to be the client of more than one lord, I was told. Firstly, the services required were such that it was not easy for the same person to perform them twofold. Secondly, a lord did not like to enter into *buhake* relations with somebody who was already the client of another *shebuja*, because such an arrangement was very likely to result in a considerable lessening of each lord's control on his client.

2. ANALYSIS OF THE CLIENTAGE STRUCTURE

(a) *Notion of feudality*

If the term 'feudal' is to be legitimately applied to the social structure described in the preceding section, it must be understood as a notion covering more than the historical sense of that term as used when referring to the Western Middle Ages. Feudality is here an 'ideal-type' in the Weberian sense.

Feudality is a particular ordering of certain human relations. This organization is based on an agreement between two individuals who unequally partake in the symbols of wealth and power culturally recognized in their society. The person who, in that respect, is inferior to the other, asks the other for his patronage, and, as a counterpart, offers his services. This is the essence of the feudal régime which must be found in any social system qualified by that term. Feudality is manifold in its modalities. The latter differ in many respects. For instance, obligations of each party may vary and be more or less definite in measure; the symbols and proofs of the feudal relation may be very dissimilar. Thus, in the European Middle Ages, the symbol and the proof of the feudal agreement was the tenure of a tract of land granted by the man in the superior position to the other. That piece of land was called a fief and the parties concerned became suzerain and vassal as soon as the tenure had been granted and accepted.

It seems that the qualification 'feudal' may be applied to the organization of social relations between a *shebuja* and a *garagu* described in the preceding section. At the root of that relation, there are two individuals having a different social status. From one of these individuals, there is a demand for aid and protection, and from the other a promise of assistance in counterpart of services. Granting the usufruct of a few cows to the man of inferior status is the symbol and proof of the agreement.

The word 'agreement' is employed here rather than 'contract' which is more frequently used in this connexion. I do not consider

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

571
675

that the kind of covenant in which the bond *shebuja-garagu* originated can be said to be a contract in the sense given to that term of Roman law and legal systems which are derived from it. There are three main differences between a contract and the *buhake* agreement.

Firstly, the freedom not to enter into such an agreement was socially illusory. In a society such as that of Ruanda, it was most inadvisable to be found without a patron. As a proverb put it, 'a dog is not feared for his fangs, but for his lord'. To live without a lord was to invite trouble.

Secondly, the lord and the client faced very different situations when *buhake* relationships had to be ended. When he wanted to break off the relation, the *shebuja* either did not give any reason or more frequently accused the *garagu* of a breach of the agreement because in that case, even if there was no merging of *imbata* and *inkazibiti* cows, he could take one or two more cows as a sort of fine. Then he recovered the cows that he himself or one of his ascendents had granted to the client. Sometimes a client accused of a breach could manage to obtain protection elsewhere, and to bring the case before a court, whereas the *shebuja* was under no obligation to present the proof of his client's misdemeanour before punishing him by seizing the cows. He was thus in a very favourable situation if, for one reason or another, he coveted some of his client's cows, or if he merely wanted to harm him. Nevertheless, informants say that a lord could not take too much advantage of his capacity to punish and despoil his clients without incurring implicit social sanctions. If he got the reputation of being a bad *shebuja*, people who were considering a *buhake* agreement were led to choose another lord.

In the reverse situation, when a client wanted to terminate the *buhake* relation with his lord, he certainly could do so, but he incurred the risk of being deprived of some of his *imbata* and if he had grievances against his lord, it was certainly not easy for him to obtain redress. Here again, however, the situation could be corrected by the interplay of the safeguards that an able and cunning man did not fail to secure. Supported by his army-chief, his lineage head or his cattle-chief, he could obtain more favourable results. But even if these counterbalances had some efficacy, it remains that the lord and the client, because of these very different conditions, did not enjoy that equal freedom to end the

9: Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

relationship which should be enjoyed by both parties according to the classical definition of contract.

A third way in which *buhake* was different from the Western conception of contract lay in the vagueness and uncertainty in the measure of the reciprocal obligations. The patron could be more or less generous in the number of cows he granted, more or less exacting in the services he required; the client could be more or less prompt and zealous in his service. If there was a dispute about these differences in the execution of the agreement, there was no charter one could refer to for an assessment of rights and duties.

(*b*) *Caste structure*

To understand the functions of the feudal system in Ruanda society, one must first clarify some important features of that society.

As our descriptions and analysis of Ruanda proceed, it becomes more and more certain that there was there a caste structure or something very similar to it. Sociologists usually define a caste society as one composed of several graded groups, each of which is endogamous and practising an hereditary occupation, membership of which can be obtained only by birth.[7]

Birth was, indeed, the usual way in which one became a Tutsi, a Hutu or a Twa. This does not mean that the three strata were 'racial' units, but that an individual was a Tutsi, a Hutu or a Twa when his father was a Tutsi, a Hutu or a Twa. In the same way was his father a Tutsi, a Hutu or a Twa. But in order to avoid such expressions, which could go on *ad infinitum*, a definition other than an hereditary one should be found. But it does not seem that there is any other than that a Tutsi, a Hutu or a Twa is a person who regarded himself, and was regarded by all those who knew him, as a Tutsi, a Hutu or a Twa, the usual way for a person to fulfil this social definition being to realize the hereditary one. In some cases, however, it was possible to be socially recognized as a Tutsi without having been begotten by a Tutsi father. For instance a Twa who had been ennobled or the son of a rich Hutu cattle owner and of a Tutsi woman, was sometimes regarded as a Tutsi. But these were exceptional cases and we may say that the caste criterion of membership by birth held in general for all the three Ruanda groups.

The same may be said of the criterion of endogamy. We saw

[7] *Cf.* Lowie, 1948, pp. 10, 273.

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

[P. 140]

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

Diagram D.

This diagram suggests the complexity of Ruanda social relations if it is remembered that an individual generally has several political roles. Thus a high chief was very often also an army chief as well as a client of the king, and all the chiefs of the two premier hierarchies had their places in the system of feudal relations as clients and patrons. The broken lines indicate some of these possible pluralities of relationships.

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

well as Tutsi. They did not feel that they were out-group people.

A fourth factor which counterbalanced the socially disintegrative influence of the caste system was the plurality of the structures in which any Ruanda was affiliated.

Through several structures, subjects were much more efficiently bound among themselves and to their rulers than in a unique hierarchy. In the latter case, indeed, if the individual can extricate himself from that hierarchy, he becomes absolutely unattached. In Ruanda, even if one link was broken, the subject did not escape from his superior chiefs. Indeed, he was linked to them, particularly to the mwami, by more than one tie. Almost any Ruanda was dependent on the king through two hierarchical channels: *via* his hill-chief (who himself was subordinated to the cattle- and land-chief) and *via* his army-chief. In addition, the feudal system integrated him into a set of personal loyalty relations such that the person occupying the superior position in one of these relations is himself an inferior in another relation.

It should be mentioned also that any Ruanda was a member of three kin groups: primary and secondary patrilineages and clan. Of course kinship affiliations as such did not cut across caste lines (except for the clan name), but as many of these kinship groups had been for so long established in Ruanda territory, they were certainly a supplementary link between the individual and his country.

The network of relations woven by the political and clientage systems was particularly important in a country where there were no clear-cut groupings based on co-residence. This has led some observers to believe that Ruanda were living in a kind of social vacuum. On the contrary, a Ruanda was never isolated: his social links connected him with the authorities and were ramified, if not in the whole territory, at least in a large area of it.

The last factor of social cohesion to be mentioned here was the ideology developed around the monarchic institution. The mwami was regarded as the king of all Ruanda and not only of the Tutsi. His divine origin keeping him separate from men, bestowed on him an authority which no commoner thought to question. He was closely connected with Imana, conceived as a supreme god rather remote but benevolent. The mwami, representative of Imana, was the father and protector of all Ruanda. Was it not enough to assume towards him a filial attitude and to feel one's

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

dependency upon him? As in many cultures in which a king is a paternal and divine image, the Ruanda monarch certainly contributed towards the creation in Ruanda individuals of a feeling of belonging to a unit which presented some similarities to a family.

This was, it seems, how the Ruanda political and feudal structures, by their complexity, succeeded in keeping an equilibrium between, on one hand, the tendencies towards social disintegration that a caste system necessarily produces and, on the other, the minimal cohesion necessary to the maintenance of a social unit such as a nation.

(*b*) *Exploitation and protection of Hutu*

The Tutsi were confronted with the dilemma that all conquerors must solve when they settle on a new territory with the intention of staying permanently: are they going to draw upon the natural resources of the country themselves, using their own labour and equipment, and to remove from the area the aboriginal inhabitants by pushing them further on and even by exterminating them as a people, or are they to let them stay and use them by having them working for their benefit? Europeans who settled in North America adopted the first solution, they did not attempt to use Indian labour and they expelled the native population from their hunting areas and began to cultivate their country. The second method has been chosen in most parts of Africa south of the Sahara where Europeans have settled.

Whether Tutsi have explicitly considered this problem is immaterial here. In fact they have adopted the solution which was most advantageous to them. Being pastoralists and not numerous (in comparison with the Hutu peasants), they had no interest in expelling them. If this had been done, they would have had either to till the land themselves or to dispense with beer, peas, sorghum, &c. It was preferable for Tutsi to adopt what Oppenheimer calls the bee-keeper's policy (as opposed to the bear's policy who for the purpose of robbing the beehive, destroys it),[4] that is to say, to keep in the country peasants in order permanently to exploit their productive work. Those who control territory are not a dominant group; it is upon men that power is exerted.

We have seen how, through the political and feudal structures, the country's surplus resources were drained and concentrated in

[4] Oppenheimer, 1922, pp. 65 ff.

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

did not play an important part in the feudal system because there were no socially recognized ties between a client and his lord's lord. Feudality was not a ranking system in the same sense as were the political structures. Each lord had his personal following; he was not as such the representative of a higher authority.

To sum up, the political and clientage structures at the same time secured the economic exploitation of the Hutu and protected them against an exaggerated pressure which could have led to disaster for the upper caste.

(c) *Delegation and centralization of political power*

Before the European occupation the kingdom's population was already numerous, probably around 1,700,000 inhabitants. The orographic configuration of the country made communications rather difficult. In that non-literate culture, an efficient collection of tributes required almost a face to face acquaintance between the subject and his ruler. These circumstances necessitated a delegation of authority to many intermediary chiefs who would be the local representatives of the rulers.

But such an unavoidable system was very dangerous for the central government. Its subordinated agents having frequently authority over a rather numerous population which could provide them with abundant supplies (if nothing was sent to the court) could be tempted to isolate themselves completely from the capital and become independent. Such a course of action would have been facilitated by the military structure and the feudal system.

Some important chiefs were, indeed, authorized to raise an army. Moreover, any military chief whose army was encamped near the border, in a district far from the capital, could gain such ascendancy over his warriors as to win over their allegiance to himself.

The *buhake* was perhaps still more dangerous because, as in any feudal system, it created personal bonds of allegiance between the client and his lord. As such, that bond of loyalty did not extend beyond the lord. One had to obey one's lord because he was one's lord and not because he was a mwami's representative. This is why any feudal system has always been so dangerous for a central government. Independence and revolt against the king have been recurring events in the areas where a feudal system existed.

Ruanda rulers were able to check successfully these tendencies

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

642 178 At the beginning of this century, Ruanda political organization was an instrument of social immobility. It was not a force of expansion meant to increase the Tutsi dominion over the country, but a machinery which succeeded in maintaining a difficult equilibrium between the antinomic tendencies I have reviewed. Any institution in which divergent tendencies meet and are kept balanced bears in itself the principle of its own disintegration. But in Ruanda the equilibrium problem had been so efficiently solved that it seems that an optimum point had been reached. The political organization that sustained the domination system could have been perpetuated as long as forces external and internal to the system itself remained constant. The external influence which modified the political organization has been the contact with the [648] Europeans, another conquest group entering Ruanda history around 1900. But apart from such a consequential event, internal phenomena such as a modification in the demographic ratio, the introduction of new agricultural techniques, the impoverishment of the soil, &c., could have been sufficient to destroy the equilibrium maintained by the Tutsi political organization.

642 178 564 661 What was 'immobilized' by the political organization was the Tutsi's caste's and rulers' almost exclusive control of power. They used it for exploitation, by which is meant here the satisfaction of needs not by economic production but by pressure. I follow here closely Oppenheimer's distinction between economic and political means. Both have the same end, he writes, the satisfaction of needs. But when this end is obtained by one's labour and the equivalent exchange of one's own labour for the labour of others, one may speak of 'economic means' while the unrequited appropriation of the labour of others is 'political means'.[6] This should, however, be qualified in the *buhake* where the client received the usufruct of cattle.

642 564 571 It would, of course, be completely misleading to assume that Ruanda political organization had for its only function the preservation of Tutsi exploitation. Through the political structure, as has been shown, the inferior castes enjoyed security. Collectively, peasants were protected against raiding expeditions of neighbours and against an unlimited and too arbitrary exploitation. Individually, in the difficult or dangerous events of life, a Hutu could rely upon the protection of his lord, of his army-chief, and

[6] Oppenheimer, 1922, p. 25.

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

of his administrative chiefs if he could not or did not wish to ask his lineage's aid.

Should one, then, speak of a counterpart and interpret the Tutsi privileges as a retribution for the care of the commonweal and public order? No, political organization in Ruanda fulfilled different functions. It cannot be said that one function is the counterpart of the other merely because it benefited different groups. It just so happened that two different functions were fulfilled by the same set of institutions.

To sum up, this political system was a means of maintaining a certain social order in which the group of rulers and their caste appropriated to their consumption a considerable part of the country's goods without having to use their labour in the productive processes.

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

indices and the lynching of Negroes in the Southern States of the Union. There is evidently no rational means for the whites of the south to impute the responsibility for the lack of rain—which was then the cause of the poor cotton crops—to Negroes. This typically irrational behaviour, however, becomes comprehensible if we accept the frustration-aggression sequence. In this sense, it can be said that the relation between the two phenomena, economic crises and lynching, is a logical relation.[8]

Ruanda political relations disclose one of the premises of that culture. Underlying the political and feudal structures there was a general assumption about human relations. In order to formulate it as accurately as may be possible, I shall first consider more closely the social roles of the superior and inferior in the field of political and feudal relations. In the following section the words 'ruler'[1] and 'subject' refer to superiors and inferiors in the administrative, military, and clientage structures.

2. THE RULER'S AND SUBJECT'S SOCIAL ROLES

The analysis of the political organization of Ruanda indicates that the ruler was expected to assume a complex role towards his subject. The two poles of it were protection and profit. The subordinate was somebody whom one protected: he was also a resource from which it was normal to draw some advantage.

Protection was not restricted to a certain field of action, but potentially encompassed the whole of the subject's life. When the inferior needed some help, any help, he was expected to apply to his ruler even if the issue was completely alien to the sphere of the main relations between the ruler and the subject. A client could ask his *shebuja* for aid in matters not pertaining to cattle and *buhake* services. It was even thought proper for the ruler to interfere in difficulties which his subject through his own misdemeanour had run into as, for instance, when an inferior had been caught stealing from somebody. When protection was refused, it was not because the question was not the ruler's concern, but on other grounds, such as disloyalty.

The extent of that protection was not strictly defined. It did not constitute for the ruler a set of particular and fixed obligations. The subordinate had a general right to be protected but very few claims to particular advantages. In *buhake*, when one offered one's

[8] Dollard, 1939, p. 44 (quoted by Maquet, 1951, p. 166).

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

services to a lord in order to become his client, one was entitled to receive usufruct of his cattle. But the number of cows was not determined. It could be one or twenty or fifty or even more.

It was up to the ruler to decide if any protection was to be granted and to what extent. Of course the pressure of public opinion obliged him not to refuse aid to his subordinate unless he had some socially accepted reason to do so (such as the subordinate's disobedience), but the measure of the protection depended on his own will and pleasure.

These characteristics of the protective attitude (care of the whole of the subordinate's life, its very variable extent being left to the superior's judgement) allow us to apply to it the qualification of 'paternalistic'. Paternalism is understood here as 'the principle of acting in a way like that of a father towards his children. Because of the total dependency of the human offspring, during their first years, on those who nurse and educate them—and they are usually their parents—the latter's authority ranges over the whole of the life of the child. In everything he needs his parents, in everything they have to direct and control him. Moreover, parents sovereignly judge what they are going to give their children. Undoubtedly, their social groups force them to secure for their children the protection they need to live and develop but the children may not require such or such a particular service. Parents decide without further ado what is suitable for the child and think that better than he they know what is 'best for him'.

A paternal relation does not exclude profit. In describing the Ruanda's father's role towards his sons, I mentioned that the father's interests were usually thought to be predominant in respect of the children's interests. When inferiors were not the superior's children but his subjects or clients, that aspect of profit was much more emphasized. All those who occupied the inferior position in the relations of the political and feudal structures had dues to give and tribute labour to perform for the profit of their superiors, and some of these obligations were heavy. It did not appear at all unusual to Ruanda that power brought many privileges to those who had it. If one is a chief, is it not fitting to draw advantages from one's situation? Here, again, the extent of the subject's obligations was left within very broad limits to the superior's discretion.

The ruler's role seems to have been that paternalistic blend of

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

protection and profit. Of course, that role was not always perfectly fulfilled. Chiefs who have been more exploiters than protectors are remembered. It was by comparison with that ideal picture that their behaviour was judged and blamed.

The subject was expected to have a role complementary to the one we have just described. He was supposed to assume an attitude of dependency. Inferiority is the relative situation of a person who has to submit to another in a well delimited field. Dependence is inferiority in the whole of life. When the ruler gives an order, he has to be obeyed, not because his order falls within the field over which he has authority, but because he is a ruler.

It could be objected that in Ruanda this attitude of dependence was not in principle unlimited. We saw that cattle- and land-chiefs could not require as many dues as they liked, that subjects could resort to higher authorities against their immediate chiefs, and that it was possible to oppose one chief against another. This does not change the fact that the dependent attitude was the only one socially expected of the subject. Indeed it was impossible to be considered a 'good' subject if one asserted independence of one's superior. A claim of independence, even limited, obliged one to leave the superior, to ask for the support of another and to assume towards the latter an attitude of complete compliance. This appeared clearly in the feudal relation. A lord could not be refused what he asked (even at the present time a shop assistant who is obliged by the law to sell only for cash, will find it very difficult not to sell on credit to his lord). He could only be deserted for another.

3. FORMULATION OF THE INEQUALITY PREMISE

When paternalism and dependence define the permanent roles expected from two persons, much more is implied than when they express the transitory roles of a father and his young son. In the latter case it is known that the son will grow up and one day, even if he has to wait till after his father's death, will be equal to what his father was when the latter was young. But when paternalism and dependence are linked in permanent reciprocal roles, the assumption is that there is a fundamental inequality between the two persons. The subject will never grow up, he will never 'reach his majority'. It is implied without any doubt that there is between the ruler and his subject a difference so fundamental that it never can be suppressed. This fundamental inequality of men is the

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

different share in social power and fundamentally different rights.

The Ruanda principle of inequality could be expressed in the following terms: people born in different castes are unequal in inborn endowment, physical as well as psychological and have consequently fundamentally different rights.

That premise, closely connected with the caste structure, is suggested by the analysis of the political and feudal structures. Indeed, when a principle of inequality exists in a society with respect to a certain type of relations, it does not fail to spread to other relations more or less similar. In Ruanda, the inegalitarian premise of inter-caste relations has permeated the intricate relations which could be regarded as analogous in certain respects. A Tutsi who was lord over another Tutsi was thought to be superior over his client in a way comparable to the manner in which he was superior over his Hutu clients. Of course significant differences remained between inter- and intra-caste relationships of superiority, but the latter tended to be patterned on the former ones.

The extension to intricate relations of the premise of inter-caste inequality made it a principle of integration with a very wide bearing as it could, and did, in fact, pervade all the human relations in which a superiority of one actor over the other was implied. It could be the relation between a mother and her young child, a father and his son, a man and his wife, an old man and a youngster, a craftsman and an apprentice, &c. These relations constituting the texture of social life, the impact on collective living of the premise of fundamental inequality, cannot be over-estimated.

4. THE THEOREMS

In order to understand better how the inequality premise influenced the whole of Ruanda social life, the different aspects of that influence must be made explicit. They will be expressed as a set of theorems, by which is meant general propositions or statements which are not self-evident.

Theorem One

When two persons are involved in any kind of social relation, it is their mutual hierarchical situation which is regarded as the most relevant element of the relation.

Superiority and inferiority were *foci* of the Ruanda social structure to such an extent that as soon as they entered as a

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

component in the content of a social intercourse, other components were regarded as less important and were coloured by the hierarchical situation of the two actors. In Euro-American culture, relationships of inferiority are defined not only as regards the people taking part in them but also as regards the matters concerned. A business executive may give orders to one of his employees only within very well-defined limits of competence and time, but he cannot oblige him to accept his views on for instance artistic or political questions. In Ruanda, on the contrary, when one of the persons involved in a dyad was superior to the other from a certain point of view, the superiority was diffused, as it were, through the whole relation. For his subject, a chief was always a chief in whatever matter.

This first theorem is a consequence of inequality conceived as essential. When two persons are considered unequal by nature, the superiority of one over the other cannot be limited to a certain sphere. Obedience in everything must be required: there is no field in which a father could be wrong and his son right.

Theorem Two

As in almost any human relation there is some superiority of one actor over the other, as that aspect is always stressed and as inferiority relations are patterned on inter-caste relations, paternalistic, and dependent attitudes were to be found in almost every human relation in Ruanda.

The only exceptions were relations between people who were equal from any point of view, as for instance young men of about the same age, belonging to the same caste and whose families were about at the same level of wealth.

This is very noticeable today, even in relations with Europeans. A clerk usually assumes towards the European he assists, a dependent attitude different from the behaviour of a European employee. The clerk expects from his employer a behaviour similar to the paternalistic attitude of the Ruanda superiors and he is puzzled and disappointed if the employer does not assume such an attitude.

Theorem Three

There is no private sector in the life of the inferior *vis-à-vis* his superior. The superior has the right to control the whole of his

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

subordinate's activities. This is not resented by the inferior as unbearable meddling. On the contrary, it is expected by the inferior who feels that such interference is a proof of the interest his superior extends to him. When a European employer avoids intruding into the privacy of a Ruanda subordinate, the latter not infrequently tends to interpret it as a withdrawal from the protective role expected from any superior.

If a subordinate were to refuse his Ruanda superior's interference on the grounds that he should not be concerned with his private affairs, such a pretension would be regarded as at least a definite lack of respect.

Theorem Four

Strictly contractual relations are not possible. To enter into a contract implies that the intended parties are previously independent of one another. If one is submitted to the other for the whole of his life, how could he freely commit himself to give the other certain services? And how could the other promise to secure his inferior a counterpart that the latter can legally claim? When entering into contractual relations, it is necessary that each prospective partner should be a person independent of and equal to the other in that context. In the Western world, admittedly, it frequently happens that an agreement which verifies the juridical forms of a contract is entered into by persons who are not independent and equal. Circumstances may exert such a pressure that freedom to accept or refuse a particular obligation is purely illusory. Conditions of independence and equality, however, are often realised. In ancient Ruanda such a situation could almost never have happened as it was rare for two persons who might otherwise be related by a contract, not to be already involved in paternalistic and dependent relations.

Moreover, after the contract has been concluded it is necessary that each partner should be able to defend himself against any demand of the other which would exceed the terms of the covenant, and that he should have the means to oblige the other to fulfil what the latter has agreed to give or to do. This implies again that one part is not completely dependent on the other. Now, as I mentioned earlier, the extent of the superior's obligations is left, in Ruanda, to his will and pleasure. Consequently, it was unthinkable for the party who was at the same time in a position

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

inferior to the other to claim some particular fulfilment of the agreed promises from the other.

This appears clearly in the difficulties Ruanda often meet when they have to adjust themselves to European labour contracts. They are sometimes confused by the fact that the employer requires from them at the same time less and more than they expect. Less because the employer does not ask for more services, for longer office hours for instance, than what has been stipulated, and more because he is very exacting in the execution of what has been undertaken, for instance in matters of punctuality.

Theorem Five

With such socially accepted conceptions about inequality, those who occupy the superior positions in most of the social relations in which they are involved, tend to develop a permanent authoritarian behaviour. This is characterized by a propensity to command, to be self-assertive, arrogant, protective, and compassionate.

Chiefs, rulers, and other superiors try to extend not only the size or range of their power (the number of people controlled) but its density (the degree of control of the subordinates).[7] Any independence manifested by the inferior will be resented as rebellious.

This leads to intolerance. The superior's opinions should never be opposed by the inferior who is always and everywhere expected to manifest his dependence by attitudes of compliance. Even today this conduct tends to prevail. Some years ago a Ruanda deliberative assembly of people of standing was asked its opinion on a contemplated reform. After the most important person present there had given his opinion, everybody voted for his proposal. But after the meeting many expressed privately their divergent opinions. At the time of the vote, they had considered it improper and impolite not to agree with the superior.

Theorem Six

Even if the caste system and political and feudal institutions have succeeded to a large extent in moulding personalities in such a way as to make inferiors self-effacing, submissive, compliant, and dependent, the conditioning has not been perfect. Often the inferior wants to disagree with his superior's opinions, to avoid executing an order or obeying his commands. A straight refusal

[7] Cf. Russell, 1938, pp. 165 f.

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundl FO42

being regarded as insulting, disrespect or revolt, the only way out for the inferior is to appear to behave always as expected: to fall in with any desire of his superior while concealing his own opinion, never to say no to any order but to find clever excuses for not doing it. Consequently dissimulation is very highly thought of and a skill necessary to master for someone wanting to live more or less securely under such a political régime.

Many stories and proverbs give evidence of the frequency of covert disobedience to the rulers and of the appreciation in which an astute excuse and a 'good lie' were held. This was the only way to adapt oneself to such a situation.

Theorem Seven

It is commonly accepted in the Western tradition that truth has a high value and that language is the medium used to express 'truth', that is to say, 'what reality appears to be to the person who speaks'. Undoubtedly, in Western practice, language is used, even in the cognitive sphere, for many other purposes than to express what the speaker thinks. Moreover, most of the scholars who, in recent years, have studied the problem of the origin and function of language, bring qualifications to the traditional view. In the almost unanimous opinion of the carriers of Western culture, however, the ideal verbal behaviour must express 'truth' and not what is useful to the speaker. This is, for example, what is inculcated into children in schools.

In a society in which human relations are imbued with some cultural premises as the one being considered in this chapter, 'truth' cannot be recognized as a dominant value. Indeed, one is supposed to use language not to say what is thought to conform to reality but what is thought to conform to the ruler's opinion. Nobody, the ruler included, entertains many illusions on the sincerity of what is said, but submission has been expressed at the right time and this is felt to be most important.

This theorem could be formulated in this way: the verbal behaviour towards a superior must express dependence rather than 'truth'.

Theorem Eight

Once it is taken for granted that in hierarchical relations, behaviour must conform to the superior's expectations even to the

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

point of agreeing with all his opinions, a similar attitude tends to spread to other fields. Each time there is a conflict between what is useful to the speaker or expected from him and what he thinks, he is apt to say rather what is useful or expected.

Thus a dependent attitude in hierarchical relationships favours the extension to all social relations of a utilitarian usage of language.

5. ORIGIN OF THE INEQUALITY PREMISE

We have read the premise, as it were, into the Ruanda political and feudal organization. But this does not solve the question of their mutual priority. Had the political organization of Ruanda, as it existed at the beginning of this century, been built in order to express a belief deeply buried in the psyche of those who have slowly formed and shaped it? Or, on the contrary, is it that the premise of inequality and its sequels have been evolved from the political organization as an ideology and a set of attitudes which fitted the political situation well?

To raise such a question is certainly legitimate in the sense that it expresses a genuine problem which, if it could be solved, would add significantly to our knowledge of the working of social systems and of cultural premises. But there are certain facts crucial to the solution of that question that we are not likely ever to know, such as a good knowledge of the Tutsi culture and its premises before the pastoralists reached Ruanda. It seems possible, however, to make some comments on this problem.

Tutsi came into Ruanda as conquerors. Even if their arrival into the country inhabited by Hutu looked rather like a peaceful infiltration, it was nevertheless a conquest. They wanted to settle in the country and they built a permanent system of economic and political relations with the Hutu whereby they established themselves definitely as masters and exploiters. That is to say, a caste society evolved from their will to stabilize the conquest situation with all its advantages. Now, the more obvious rationalization of a caste structure is the belief that there are inborn and fundamental differences between the members of different castes.

This is not meant to be a schematic view of the historical origin of the Ruanda inequality premise. It is possible that Tutsi had previously to their arrival in Ruanda such a belief, perhaps already embodied in their social organization, or in their external relations with surrounding peoples, and that quite naturally they

10;Albert E-5 (1956-1957)1963
FO42 Rundi FO42

or will take back the cow he has given. In turn, superiors consider defection and disloyalty as the worst of crimes. Even if a servant is insolent and lazy, he will be well taken care of if he always tells his master whatever news and rumours he has heard about him. A woman who is disagreeable, lazy or even sterile will not be chased from the household if she is clever in helping her husband with his business and if she never speaks ill of him. An individual may have confidence only in his blood-friend, male or female. However, occasionally, true friendship ties a vassal to his chief or a *mwami-kazi* to her confidential servant. In these secure and friendly relationships, the principals tell each other their troubles, give each other advice, and remain loyal to each other forever. It is a matter for much discussion when a husband and wife stay together for 20 years, both married and mutually affectionate. However, neighbours, acquaintances, relatives, and spouses, it is said, do not remain friendly for a very long time. Several months, at most two or three years, suffice to create reasons for hatred, jealousy, vengeance, burning a house, calumny, fights, and visits to the witch to obtain poison.

The maximum of instability is associated with the role of the *abatoni*, the favourites. Fierce rivalry is considered normal among inferiors of the same rank—the men of the princely courts, brothers, plural wives, the servants of the Tutsi. The favourite son or wife is envied by his or her peers and must expect quarrels, poison and calumny. Because a superior may easily change his mind about a favourite, someone else will wait hopefully to take his place, In fact, happiness—many children, a good harvest, a cow which gives much milk, a present large or small—is the mark of the favourites of *Imana* and of human beings. One has received, one is liked by a superior, one is hated by all those who have not received. By this syllogism, it is logical for a rich Tutsi to be jealous both of a poor Hutukazi who has just received from her son-in-law a length of cheap cotton cloth and of a rich Tutsi who has just received another cow. To receive and be liked are identical. Together, they constitute the core of the well-being of inferiors.

Although *ubgenge*, intelligence, is normally accounted an attribute of superiors, it is well understood that inferiors have great need of it. The superior must be intelligent in order to exercise his authority, to judge well of his inferiors, to know the right moment to give and to take back. The *ubgenge* of an inferior has obviously to be of another kind. His goal is to make his superior like him. He must therefore understand his character, his moods, his fears, his desires. He must learn how to flatter him and to seem

554 always loyal and devoted. The *umutoni* is before all else an informer.
571 It is the way to show his interest in the well-being of his superior. It is for this that he is favoured and given gifts. Men who are poor or women who are by law without property, if they know how to play the role of the inferior effectively, can become rich, have their advice heeded, and find life most agreeable.

Attitudes and behaviour change according to role. Everyone has his turn as an inferior, if not to a human being, then to *Imana*. Adult Rundi have their turn as superiors to their children and to various others according to their rank. There is an astonishing ease and rapidity of psychological change according to the situation.
[586] The very man who explains to you today that he has sent his wife back home because she did not work enough, will tell you tomorrow that he was dismissed by his master for no other reason than that his enemies calumniated him—he does not see that he has been disobedient or lazy. A woman who has just served her husband his dinner from a humble, kneeling position, on leaving the house, gives haughty, authoritative commands to the men who work for her. Like any other superior, a woman as the mistress of her house, as a mother, and as an elder sister, commands and punishes. She is respected, she chooses her favourites, and her inferiors ask her for presents. When her role is that of an inferior, she must be obedient, she must work, she must ask for presents, she tries to win the affection of her superior, and she is jealous of those who receive presents.

461 The Rundi conception of the innate differences between men and women is as well-defined as their conception of the innate
562 differences among the various castes and of much the same content.
564 Both Tutsi and Hutu and men and women agree on the stereotypic differences of physique and of psychology between the two sexes. To begin with, it is believed that women are better suited by nature than men for manual labour. They work better and longer in the fields than men. The Hutukazi are able to carry on their heads
[482] burdens twice as heavy as those which men can carry. It is generally known that there are more old men than old women and that
[165] women age more quickly than men. The Rundi refuse categorically the hypothesis that those who work harder die younger. Men and women both insist that women are made for work and that they die younger because of the hardships of child-bearing. It is nonethe-
[842] less believed that the male role is more important than that of the female in procreation. Woman, says the proverb, is only the passive earth; it is the man who provides the seed.

562 Stronger than men, women are thought to be less agile. Conse-
593